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Abstract
On July 21, 1992, six outside directors on the board of Westar Mining Ltd. resigned abruptly from the
company's board of directors. Westar was a troubled mining company operating in British Columbia. In 1991,
the company had lost $62.2 million, mainly as the result of a poorly performing export coal mine. While
resigning from the board, the directors assured the public that there had been no wrongdoing by the company.
Rather, the reason for their departure was related to concern over personal liability for wages and other
benefits that might be owed to more than 1900 of the company's employees under provincial employment
standards legislation should the company become insolvent. Despite the fact that their departure might not
absolve them from liability for other duties and would greatly complicate the company's bid for survival, the
size of the personal liabilities they faced - more than $20 million - left the directors little choice.
Predictably, the announcement of the resignations created considerable consternation in the financial
community, the magnitude of which was enhanced when, just one week after the Westar resignations, the
entire board of PWA Corp. resigned en masse from the boards of each of its subsidiaries, including Canadian
Airlines Ltd. As in the case of Westar, the directors attributed their decision to the fear that they "would be
forced to pay employee wages, taxes or some other obligation out of their own pockets should the struggling
airline run out of money".
These highly publicized defections have been invoked by critics as exemplifying the rather myopic and
unthinking addiction that Canadian governments have developed to the elixir of directors' liability. By one
legal practitioner's account, in Ontario alone more than 100 different federal and provincial statutes prescribe
some type of directors' liability. Some critics have gone further and have viewed the board resignations as a
powerful passion play that demonstrates in vivid terms the callous and hostile treatment that Canadian
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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 21, 1992, six outside directors on the board of Westar
Mining Ltd. resigned abruptly from the company's board of
directors.! Westar was a troubled mining company operating in
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Toronto. This is the revised version of a paper
presented by the author at a Conference on International and Comparative Commercial
Insolvency Law held at the University of Toronto on June 24-26, 1993, and will also be
published in book form in J.S. Ziegel, ed., Current Developments in International and
Comparative Corporate Insolvency Law (Oxford Univ. Press, 1994), chapter 23.
1 Patrick Lush, "Six Westar directors resign", Globe and Mail, July 22,1992, p. 81; Patrick
Lush, "Westar's directors and officers quit", Globe and Mail, August 26,1992, p. 81.
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British Columbia. In 1991, the company had lost $62.2 million,
mainly as the result of a poorly performing export coal mine.
While resigning from the board, the directors assured the public
that there had been no wrongdoing by the company. Rather, the
reason for their departure was related to concern over personal
liability for wages and other benefits that might be owed to more
than 1900 of the company's employees under provincial
employment standards legislation should the company become
insolvent. Despite the fact that their departure might not absolve
them from liability for other duties and would greatly complicate
the company's bid for survival, the size of the personal liabilities
they faced - more than $20 million - left the directors little
choice.
Predictably, the announcement of the resignations created
considerable consternation in the financial community, the
magnitude of which was enhanced when, just one week after the
Westar resignations, the entire board of PWA Corp. resigned en
masse from the boards of each of its subsidiaries, including
Canadian Airlines Ltd.2 As in the case of Westar, the directors
attributed their decision to the fear that they "would be forced to
pay employee wages, taxes or some other obligation out of their
own pockets should the struggling airline run out of money". 3
These highly publicized defections have been invoked by critics
as exemplifying the rather myopic and unthinking addiction that
Canadian governments have developed to the elixir of directors'
liability.4 By one legal practitioner's account, in Ontario alone
more than 100 different federal and provincial statutes prescribe
some type of directors' liability.5 Some critics have gone further
and have viewed the board resignations as a powerful passion play
that demonstrates in vivid terms the callous and hostile treatment
that Canadian shareholders and business managers can expect to
receive at the hands of populist legislatures.6
2 Harvey Enchin, "Nervous directors bailout", Globe and Mail, Friday July 31, 1992, p.
B1.
3/bid.
4 See, for instance, Chelthan Lakshman, "Why would anyone be a director", The Financial
Post, August 3, 1992, p. 5; and "Don't drive directors from boards", The Financial Post,
August 8/10,1992, p. S1.
5 D. Palmateer et al., "Statutory Liabilities and Offenses of Directors and Officers in
Ontario", draft memorandum dated October 9, 1990.
6 "The message of the great Westar revolt" (the Westar resignations give the lie to the
notion of the businessman as inanimate object), Globe and Mail, Friday July 24, 1992, p.
A14.
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Yet, despite the intense and often shrill terms of the public
debate over the proliferation of these statutory provisions, their
existence poses some very vexing challenges for mainstream
theories of corporate law. By and large, corporate law theory has
wrestled with the issue of the appropriate nature and scope of
discretionary duties owed by directors to shareholder versus non-
shareholder interests.? This issue was first canvassed by Berle and
Dodd in a landmark debate in the Harvard Law Review in 1932.8
While the Stakeholder Debate has attracted frequent academic
attention since then, for all intents and purposes the sheer weight
of judicial and legislative precedent has settled the issue in favour
of those arguing for duties owed by directors to shareholders
exclusively.9 And although there was some legislative and judicial
backsliding from this position during the "Takeover Wars" of the
1980s, most commentators doubt that these developments were
anything more than minor skirmishes that leave the shareholder
welfare conception of the corporation largely undisturbed. 10
The case for narrow discretionary duties to shareholders is
based on an amalgam of efficiency and political legitimacy
arguments. In respect of the former, the claim is that under a
regime which permits, indeed requires, directors to vindicate the
full panoply of stakeholder interests, directors would effectively
be rendered accountable to no one. ll Essentially, under a stake-
holder regime, directors would always be able to invoke some
stakeholder interest to justify even the most venal forms of self-in-
dulgence, and one of the core features of corporate law
(permitting specialization economies to be realized through the
7 The economic case for broad discretionary duties owed by directors and managers to
stakeholders is canvassed in J. Macey, "An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales
for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties"
(1991),21 Stetson L.R. 23. For a more recent treatment of this issue, see J. MacIntosh
(1993),43 U. T. LJ. 425.
8 E.M. Dodd, "For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?" (1932), 45 Harv. L.Rev.
1145; A. Berle, "For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note" (1932), 45
Harv. L. Rev. 1365.
9 See the discussion in R. Daniels, "Stakeholders and Takeovers: Can Contractarianism be
Compassionate" (1993),43 U.T.L.J. 315.
10 For example, see: Committee on Corporate Laws, "Other Constituency Statutes:
Potential for Confusion" (1990),45 Business Lawyer 2253.
11 The point has been most convincingly made by Berle in his response to Dodd: "[Y]ou can
not abandon emphasis on the view that business corporations exist for the sole purpose of
making profits for their stockholders until such time as you are prepared to offer a clear
and reasonably enforceable scheme of responsibility to someone else": Berle, supra,
footnote 8, at p. 1367.
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controlled delegation of power from shareholders to directors)
would be undermined, which, in turn, would inflict costs on the
broader economy. The latter concern, political legitimacy, has
been tied to the pernicious distributional and ethical effects of
allowing directorial elites to utilize corporate resources to
vindicate their vision of the social good.l2 It is preferable that
democratically elected and accountable legislatures make these
quintessentially public choices. 13
At first blush, the burgeoning growth of statutory duties and
liabilities of directors would hardly seem to warrant condem-
nation, given the background of accountability and political legit-
imacy concerns which lie at the heart of the Stakeholder Debate.
Because they impose explicit duties, these statutory provisions do
not create a prospect of unconstrained directorial frolics. In
varying degrees of specificity, directors are told the narrow goals
that they are to pursue and sometimes even the means for doing
so. And since these duties are enacted by legislatures, presumably
in response to externalities created by the corporation they do not
implicate issues of political legitimacy.
Nevertheless, the spectre of directors of Canada's leading
corporations resigning en masse from the boards of troubled
companies is a serious concern. While there is controversy about
the level of actual oversight and control exercised by directors
over managers in the normal course of a corporation's activities,
most empirical studies of boards confirm that directors do become
more activist when a corporation is in severe financial distress. 14
This activism is extremely valuable as it is responsive to the
heightened incentive for opportunistic risk-taking by shareholders
and managers, contrary to the interests of fixed claimants, as the
corporation enters the "vicinity of insolvency". Unless directors
can be counted on to scrutinize the corporations' behaviour in
distress situations, creditors will have to rely on other, presumably
more costly, techniques to protect their interests, which will
increase the costs to shareholders ofconducting economic activity.
12 See, for instance, M. Friedman, "The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its
Profits", New York Times, September 13,1970, p. 33 (Magazine). For a lucid analysis of
the political assumptions embedded in various critiques of corporate law, see: R.
Romano, "Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform" (1984), 36 Stan. L.Rev. 923.
13 However, contra, see: R. Mundheim, "A Comment on the Social Responsibilities of Life
Insurance Companies as Investors" (1975),61 Va. L. Rev. 1247, at pp. 1256-8.
14 See: Mace, infra, footnote 68, and Lorsch, infra, footnote 68.
HeinOnline -- 24 Can. Bus. L.J. 233 1994-1995
1994-95] Must Boards Go Overboard? 233
The potential for liability chill imposing costs on the corporation
exists even when the board resists the temptation to defect in a
distress situation; to avoid liability, directors may well be induced
to operate the company in an excessively risk averse fashion
which, again, retards the wealth-creating capacity of the corpo-
ration. Hence, the mere fact that the legislature has given explicit
instructions to directors does not necessarily mean that agency
problems between directors and various corporate constituencies
have been resolved. In the end, directors' liability provisions may
be undesirable from a welfare perspective because of their
unintended (and socially undesirable) effects on directorial
behaviour.
In this article, I sketch out a framework for determining the
appropriate scope of statutory directors' liability. Following
Kraakman, the starting point for this analysis is to understand why
the state would deviate from reliance on enterprise liability as the
exclusive means of internalizing the consequences of corporate
conduct. IS If, through the imposition of optimal fines, the state is
capable of internalizing the costs of injury back onto the corpo-
ration, then what role is there for directors' liability? Here, the
rationale for supplementary liability is based on perverse incen-
tives introduced by limited liability, infirmities in existing sanction
schemes and endemic internal agency costs. I consider each of
these in turn and identify those cases where enterprise liability is
least likely to induce corporations to act in a socially optimum
fashion. Having identified those cases where enterprise liability is
likely to fail, I then examine the case for imposing supplementary
liability on directors. Rather than looking to other corporate
actors (shareholders, managers, creditors, employees and profes-
sional advisers), what factors inform the widespread reliance on
oversight by directors? In the context of this discussion, I draw
some general conclusions respecting the appropriate ambit of
directors' liability.
15 R. Kraakman, "Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls" (1984),
93 Yale L.J. 857; "Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy"
(1986),2 J. L., Economics and Organization 53.
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II. THE DEFECTS OF ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
1. Externalities and Optimal Penalties
[Vol. 24
One of the standard rationales for state intervention is the inter-
nalization of external effects. 16 To achieve allocative efficiency
goals, the state is required to either tax or subsidize certain activ-
ities in order to ensure that the private benefits and costs of those
activities are commensurate with the social benefits and costs that
are occasioned. In the case of negative externalities connected to
corporate conduct, internalization is achieved through the
imposition of optimal penalties that are based on the social costs of
the activity divided by the probability of detection. 17 Under
neoclassical models of the firm, the threat of optimal fines should
cause rational shareholders to instruct their agents to invest in
avoidance activity to the point where the marginal costs of
additional investment in avoidance activities equal the marginal
benefits thereof. And because accountability is not a problem in
the neoclassical model, agents will dutifully implement the
instructions of their shareholder principals. In this respect,
corporate personality is oflittle consequence.
2. Constraints on the Creation and Enforcement of Optimal
Penalties
Nevertheless, when infirmities in private and public decision-
making are taken into account, the efficacy of exclusive reliance
on enterprise liability as a mechanism for achieving allocative
efficiency becomes much less clear. The first difficulty for the
model is the existence of practical constraints on creating and
enforcing optimal penalties through increases in the level of fines
to compensate for low rates of apprehension and conviction.
16 The rationales for public intervention are discussed in J. Stiglitz, Economics ofthe Public
Sector, 2nd ed. (New York, Norton and Co., 1988), pp. 75-6. For a critical discussion of
the role of externalities as a rationale for public intervention, see: C. Dahlman, "The
Problem of Externality" (1979), J. L. and Economics 141.
17 Optimal penalties are discussed in R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 3rd ed.
(Boston, Mass., Little Brown and Co., 1986), pp. 205-13. See also: J. Arlen, "Optimum
Criminal Sanctions for Corporations", Working Paper WS 1992-93-10 in Law and
Economics Workshop Series of the Law and Economics Programme at the Faculty of
Law, University of Toronto; G. Becker, "Make Punishment Fit the Corporate Crime",
Business Week (March 13, 1989), p. 22, c. 2; and W. Landes, "Optimal Sanctions for
Antitrust Violations" (1983), 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 652.
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While the model envisages that fines can be raised without
constraint, concerns about due process and fairness have
prompted courts and juries to limit the level of penalties that the
state is able to impose on wrongdoers. I8 Apart from these moral
concerns, the size of fines is also constrained by marginal deter-
rence and solvency problems. I9 Where fines are set at extremely
high levels, wrongdoers will have perverse incentives to increase
the magnitude of their wrongdoing since they will already face
high levels of punishment. Inevitably then, to achieve optimal
penalties, the state is left with little choice but to increase the
amount of resources expended on monitoring and enforcement in
an effort to increase the probability of detection. However, in the
current fiscal environment, it is often difficult for administrative
agencies charged with enforcement of various regulations to
secure the resources necessary to beef up their enforcement effort
and, as a consequence, penalties will be below their optimal level.
The existence of moral, administrative and ethical constraints
related to the imposition of optimal penalties has led a number of
commentators to consider the feasibility of supplementary
liability.2o Simply put, governments are considered incapable of
creating efficient fines against corporations. But it may be
deceptive to assess the efficiency of optimal penalties by focusing
solely on the level of fines imposed by the state. The prosecution
and conviction of a firm for wrongdoing may transmit valuable
information to shareholders that will cause them to reassess the
underlying value of the firm. 21 Cornell and Shapiro, for instance,
argue that reputational capital is an important component of
organizational capital. 22 If a breach of an obligation (to stake-
holders or to society) is construed by stakeholders as evidence of
18 See generally the discussion in B. Chapman and M. Trebilcock, "Punitive Damages:
Divergence in Search of a Rationale" (1989), 40 Alabama L. Rev. 741.
19 Posner, supra, footnote 17.
20 Kraakman, supra, footnote 15.
21 Interactive stakeholder monitoring is discussed in R. Daniels and G. Triantis, "The Role
of Debt in American Corporate Governance", draft dated April 28, 1993, on file with the
author.
22 B. Cornell and A. Shapiro, "Corporate Stakeholders and Corporate Finance" [Spring,
1987] Financial Management 5, at p. 8. Cornell and Shapiro cite IBM's willingness to
manufacture parts and do repairs for its discontinued PC Jr. computer line, despite the
losses that it created for the company. IBM's willingness to do so was not motivated by
altruism, but by concern over the signalling effect that breach of this commitment would
have had on other present and future implicit obligations that the company had made or
might wish to make in the future.
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managerial willingness to breach obligations generally, this will
impact the value of the firm. Indeed, in a recent empirical study,
Jonathan Karpoff and John Lott found that announcements of
criminal wrongdoing impose on firms substantial reputational
penalties that greatly exceed the value of the fines levied on them
by the state. 23 .
3. The Option Value of Limited Liability
The second major difficulty for the model is the existence of
limited liability. Typically, in the financially solvent corporation,
limited liability does not distort social incentives for responsible
shareholder conduct. Assuming that optimal fines could be
devised and enforced, shareholders would avoid engaging in
sanctioned conduct up to the point where the marginal costs of
avoidance equal the marginal benefits. Risk neutral shareholders
will wish to avoid these fines because payment drains the corpo-
ration of profits that could otherwise be used to pay dividends to
shareholders or, alternatively, to fund positive net present value
projects that would increase the value of the shareholders' claims.
Nevertheless, as is implied by the standard agency analysis of the
levered corporation, shareholders in financially distressed
companies will be inclined to engage in risky behaviour in order to
increase the option value of their equity investment. 24 In some
circumstances, shareholders will be able to do this by avoiding
their social responsibilities. Shareholders may, for instance, adopt
projects that entail an increased likelihood of excessive gain but at
23 J. Karpoff and J. Lott, "The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from Committing
Criminal Fraud" (1993), 36 J. Law and Economics 757. Using data on 132 cases of
alleged and actual corporate fraud from 1978 to 1987, the researchers found that initial
press reports of allegations or investigations of corporate fraud against private parties
were associated with average decreases of 1.34%, or $60.8 million, in the value of the
common stock of affected companies. For frauds against government agencies, the loss in
value is 5.05%, or $40.0 million. Since court-imposed costs represented just 6.5% of the
total loss (penalties and criminal fines accounted for 1.4%), the loss in share value cannot
be attributed to costs of expected state sanctions. These costs must reflect losses in the
value of firm reputation.
24 For a general introduction to agency theory in the context of the corporation, see:
Bamea, Haugen and Senbet, Agency Problems and Financial Contracting (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1985), or W.A. Klein and J.e. Coffee, Business
Organizations and Finance: Legal and Economic Principles, 4th ed. (Westbury, N.Y.,
Foundation Press, 1990). Option theory and limited liability are discussed in R. Brealey
and S. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance, 2nd ed. (New York, McGraw Hill Book
Co., 1984), chapter 20.
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the cost of social injury. If the project succeeds, the corporation
will be in a position to pay the fine to the state. If it is unsuccessful
and the company fails, the state, like other fixed claimants, will be
forced to bearthe 10ss.25
The impact of limited liability on shareholder incentives for
opportunistic risk-taking depends on a number of different
factors. First, as will be discussed below, owing to endemic agency
problems, managers may not be willing to implement a course of
wrongdoing that would further shareholder interests. Second, in
respect of wrongdoing penalized by optimal fines, limited liability
matters only when the company veers close to insolvency. Finally,
while shareholders' financial wealth may be shielded from respon-
sibility for wrongdoing, their reputational assets (esteem, stature
in the community) may not be. Obviously, the more visible the
connection between shareholders and the corporation, the more
intense the sanction from the community. 26 These concerns are
likely to be most acute when the company is closely held. While
not a perfect answer to shareholder opportunism, community
sanctions will increase the costs to shareholders of corporate
wrongdoing.
4. Agency Problems
The third and most important difficulty for the model of
exclusive enterprise liability is endemic agency problems. These
problems cut in a number of directions and greatly confound
predictions of how a corporation will respond to optimal
penalties.27 Although the received model of corporate law regards
shareholders as the principals of the corporation, the fact remains
that a variety of factors undermine the allegiance of directors and
managers to shareholder interests. 28 As Berie and Means
25 Obviously, if, as many commentators have suggested, the ability to control the corpo-
ration follows shifts in residual claimant status, then these problems will be ameliorated
(J. Macey, "Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment
of Fundamental Corporate Changes", [1989] Duke L.J. 173). Nevertheless, valuation
uncertainties, as well as technical legal barriers, make rapid control shifts in the context
of financially distressed companies problematic.
26 Community standing as a mechanism for promoting efficient forms of behaviour is
discussed in R. Daniels, "The Law Firm as an Efficient Community" (1992),37 McGill
L.J.801.
27 See discussion in J. Macey, "Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of Corporations"
(1991),71 Boston U. L. Rev. 315.
28 The pioneering work in the economic analysis of corporate law is by Henry Manne,
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observed, these problems are most severe in the context of widely
held companies. 29 Due to innate co-ordination problems, share-
holders will systematically under-invest in monitoring and discip-
lining their agents. Shareholders will be "rationally apathetic" ,30
realizing that the benefits of their investment will accrue to all but
the costs will be borne by each alone. Consequently, rather than
investing in monitoring and control, shareholders will prefer to
free ride on the efforts of others. And, of course, if this is rational
for one, it is equally rational for all and sub-optimal monitoring
will take place.
Further compounding these difficulties are a variety of legal
barriers. As Eisenberg has shown, the legal model of the corpo-
ration impairs shareholders' capacity to control and influence the
corporate agenda. 31 Although shareholders are entitled to elect
directors annually at general meetings, to requisition special
meetings and to enforce directors' specific legal duties, each of
these mechanisms is costly to invoke and is subject to inherent
limitations. And while some commentators express faith in a
variety of structuraP2 (independent directors), political (institu-
tional investor activism),33 and market mechanisms (product,
capital and takeover markets)34 to surmount these problems, their
efficacy, in so far as aligning shareholder and managerial interests
is concerned, is dubious: some residual agency costs remain.35
"Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control" (1965),73 J. Pol. Econ. 110; and by F.
Easterbrook and D. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Cambridge,
Mass., Harv. U. Press, 1991).
29 A. Berle and G. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York,
MacMillan, 1933).
30 The term is credited to R. Clark. See discussion in R. Clark, Corporate Law (Boston,
Mass., Little Brown and Co., 1986), chapter 3.
31 Mel Eisenberg, "Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modem Corporation:
Officers, Directors and Accountants" (1975), 63 Cal. L. Rev. 375. An efficiency
rationale for the legal model is furnished by J. Gordon, "Just Winners and Losers: The
Application of Game Theory to Corporate Law and Practice" (1991),60 U. Cincinnati
L. Rev. 405.
32 Eisenberg, ibid.
33 J. Barnard, "Institutional Investors and the New Corporate Governance" (1991),69 N.
C. L.Rev. 435; B. Black, "Shareholder Passivity Reexamined" (1990),89 Mich. L.Rev.
520; and B. Black, "Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Voice"
(1992),39 U.C.L.A. 811.
34 M. Jensen and W. Meckling, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure" (1976), 3J. Fin. Econ. 305.
35 In respect of independent directors, see: V. Brudney, "The Independent Director-
Heavenly City or Potemkin Village" (1982), 95 Harv. L. Rev. 597; and K. Scott, "Corpo-
ration Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project" (1983),35
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In this vein, it is necessary to acknowledge that directors and
managers will not be perfect agents for dispersed shareholders. In
the parlance of contemporary agency theory, managers will
engage in opportunistic behaviour that is aimed at the diversion of
shareholder wealth. In some cases, self-indulgent behaviour takes
the form of shirking - the propensity to avoid undertaking
expected levels of effort in the management of the company. In
other cases, the difficulty is more serious and involves the misap-
propriation of corporate assets.36 However, the final and perhaps
most widespread problem is risk aversion: the failure of managers
to select certain positive net present value projects for the corpo-
ration because they increase firm specific risks of failure. 37 While
shareholders can reduce the impact ofthese risks by holding diver-
sified portfolios, infirmities in human capital markets limit the
ability of managers to achieve effective diversification.
The combined effect of these various agency problems on
managers' fidelity to shareholder interests confounds the analysis
of corporate incentives to engage in conduct that is sanctioned by
optimal fines. To begin with, as argued above, when corporations
are financially solvent, risk neutral shareholders are unlikely to
have strong ex ante incentives to engage in wrongful acts. 38 The
expected value of the optimal fine should deter any incentive to
assume the risk of liability. The case, however, for senior
managers is more complex.39 Risk averse or even risk neutral
Stan. L. Rev. 927. In respect of market mechanisms, see: V. Brudney, "Corporate
Governance, Agency Costs and the Rhetoric of Contract" (1985), 85 Col. L. Rev. 1403.
Finally, in respect of institutional investors, see: J. Coffee, "Liquidity versus Control:
The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor" (1991), 91 Col. L. Rev. 1277, and E.
Rock, "The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism"
(1991),79 Georgetown L.J. 445.
36 Shirking and diversion are discussed in J. Ziegel et al., Cases and Materials on Partner-
ships and Canadian Business Corporations, 2nd ed. (Toronto, Carswell and Co., 1989),
pp.367-80.
37 Y. Amihud et ai, "Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers"
(1981),12 Bell J. Econ. 605, and" 'Managerialism', 'Ownership' and Risk" (1983),7 J.
Banking Fin. 189. See also: A. Marcus, "Risk Sharing and the Theory of the Firm"
(1982), 13 BellJ. Econ. 369.
38 This analysis implicitly assumes that managers or employees who engage in wrongdoing
do not attempt to divert some of the gains they generate for the corporation to
themselves. In other words, the wrongdoers are entitled to keep only that portion of the
gain that is contemplated by the terms of their compensation arrangements with the firm.
39 I do not explicitly deal with the case of divisional managers and employees. To the extent
that their division is performing well, the analysis tracks the argument developed in
relation to senior managers in the solvent corporation. However, if their divisions are
performing poorly, the analysis is closer to the analysis of managerial behaviour in the
insolvent company.
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senior managers are unlikely to assume the risk of engaging in
proscribed conduct. Such conduct presents the manager with
limited upside potential and substantial downside risks. In the
manager's best case scenario, her wrongdoing goes undetected by
the state and by senior corporate managers and directors. In this
case, her activities will be profitable to the corporation and, under
most performance-based compensation systems, the manager can
be entitled to keep some modest percentage of the ill~gotten gain;
the lion's share will go to the corporation's shareholders.40
However, managers face non-trivial risks of discipline in the
event that the wrongful activity is detected by either the state or
the shareholders. In the case of detection by the state, the corpo-
ration will be publicly prosecuted and penalized. Although the
optimal penalty is likely to far exceed the personal assets of the
manager wrongdoer (and thus be beyond her ability to pay), the
manager still faces significant costs from detection. To distance
itself from her conduct, the corporation will be inclined to dismiss
the manager, to publicly condemn her and even, perhaps, to sue
her for damages. In tandem, these actions are certain to inflict a
devastating toll on the manager's investment in human capital.
In the case of detection by the shareholders alone, the manager
can also expect to face discipline by the corporation despite the
fact that, ex post, her conduct has proven profitable to share-
holders. While shareholders will be hesitant to publicly penalize
the manager (for fear of informing the state of the wrongdoing,
which will subject the corporation to prosecution and to fines41),
they will be disposed to quietly but firmly sanction her conduct.
Shareholders will worry that a failure to penalize wrongful
conduct will encourage other managers to decide unilaterally to
gamble the firm's assets on wrongdoing, which may be detected by
the state and punished by large fines. In summation then, for
senior managers in a solvent company, wrongdoing would appear
to hold little attraction.
The analysis of managerial conduct shifts if the corporation is
financially distressed. As discussed above, shareholder incentives
for risk-taking will be greatest in this setting. The question is
40 M. Jensen and K. Murphy, in "Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives"
(1990),98 J. Pol. Econ. 225, find that most executive compensation arrangements permit
managers to keep only a trifling percentage of the gains they produce for corporations
(CEO wealth changes $3.25 for every $1,000 change in shareholder wealth).
41 See Arlen, supra, footnote 17.
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whether shareholder desires translate into managerial action. As
shown by LoPucki and Whitford and by Gilson, most managers
will not retain their jobs through the bankruptcy and reorgani-
zation process.42 Thus, while managers are usually risk averse,
their preferences may shift as the company nears insolvency
because they fear that they have little to lose, and it is at this point
that they will be willing to engage in prohibited conduct. Because
shareholder action is not a necessary condition for corporate
action, willingness to engage in wrongdoing is primarily a function
of managerial self-interest and so, with or without shareholder
agency costs, shareholders' and managers' interests will coincide.
On the other hand, in light of their imminent re-entry into the job
market, managers may reason that the best strategy to adopt in a
distress situation is one of honesty and integrity. Rather than using
wrongdoing as a way of gambling the company back to success, the
managers may decide to avoid scrupulously any hint of wrong-
doing out of a concern for inflicting irrevocable damage on their
reputational capital in the managerial job market.43
5. Assessment of the Case for Enterprise Liability
The foregoing discussion indicates that enterprise liability in a
regime characterized by optimal fines should, in the vast majority
of cases, ensure corporate adherence to explicit social obligations.
42 L. LoPucki and W. Whitford, "Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy, Reorgani-
zation of Large, Publicly Held Companies" (1993), 141 U. Penn. L. Rev. 669 (90% of
CEOs of firms in the sample were replaced in the period beginning 18 months prior to the
filing of a plan and ending 6 months afterward); S.C. Gilson, "Bankruptcy, Boards,
Banks and Block Holders" (1990), 27 J. Fin. Econ. 355 at pp. 369-71 (half of the
companies in the sample of companies in Chapter 11 or private reorganization removed
the CEO or directors during restructuring process).
43 Managers' refusal to follow shareholder desires by wrongdoing should not be regarded as
a pure agency problem. In a near insolvency situation, residual claimant status is
ambiguous and, functionally, though not at law, managers could be regarded as agents of
creditors as much as of shareholders. Alternatively, managerial resistance to shareholder
desires for risk-taking may be seen as consonant with the terms of the ex ante contract
negotiated between shareholders and managers. As A. Shleifer and L. Summers have
argued in another context ("Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers", chapter 2 in A.
Auerbach, ed., Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences (Chicago, III., U. Chi.
Press, 1988», the reputational integrity of managers is a bond that shareholders can post
to other stakeholders that reduces the costs of monitoring and contracting. According to
the authors, managerial reputational bonds are so valuable in facilitating cost effective
contracting that "shareholders ... (will) seek out or train individuals who are capable of
commitment to stakeholders, elevate them to management, and entrench them" (at p. 40,
emphasis added).
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None the less, the analysis also indicates that there are a range of
situations in which enterprise liablity may not be sufficient to
secure socially optimal outcomes. However, given the complex
interplay of factors involved, these situations defy neat categori-
zation and facile regulatory solutions. The task for policy-makers
is to determine when, why and to what degree enterprise liability
is likely to fail and then determine, as among a number of different
alternatives, if a Pareto improvement is possible and the most
efficient way of realizing it. In this respect, supplementary ex post
liability for particular corporate actors is but one of many choices.
Defects in the calculation of optimal fines may be best redressed
by more vigorous enforcement (raising the probability of
detection) or by redesign of the social and legal institutions that
constrain the imposition of the optimal fine. Alternatively,
minimum capital and insurance levels for corporations may be an
attractive option.44
In any event, across the entire range of policy options available
to correct for defects in enterprise liability, it is important for
policy-makers to avoid falling prey to the Nirvana fallacy. Just
because a defect in the existing structure of liability has been
identified does not mean that the state, even through the most
well-intentioned and nuanced use of public instruments, will be
able to generate welfare gains for society by changing the
structure. Infirmities in public decision-making, combined with
unanticipated and perverse behavioural responses by those
subject to regulation, may thwart ostensible social gains.45 This is
particularly important to bear in mind when contemplating
supplementary personal liability. Whereas enterprise liability
allows shareholders the latitude to devise regimes for controlling
liability exposure that are configured to the specific needs of their
firm, supplemental liability is a much blunter instrument that may
inhibit implementation ofoptimal arrangements.
44 See discussion in the judgment of Fuld J. in Walkovsky v. Carlton, 223 N.E. 2d 6
(N.Y.C.A.,1966).
45 For a lucid discussion of this problem, see: C. Wolf, "A Theory of Nonmarket Failure:
Framework forImplementation Analysis" (1979), 22J. L. and Economics 107.
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III. DIRECTORS AS SOCIAL MONITORS OF CORPORATE
CONDUCT
1. The Case for Supplementing Enterprise Liability with
Directorial Liability
If it is assumed that a case exists for resorting to some type of
supplementary liability in an effort to bring corporate and social
interests into alignment, the question then becomes which actors
associated with the corporation are the most appropriate targets of
liability. A related question is whether this liability should be
imposed absolutely or strictly, and whether it should be subject to
explicit transfer. Recently, this issue has attracted considerable
attention in the context of supplementary shareholder liability.46
However, for the purpose of this article, I wish to concentrate
solely on directorial liability , which has been generally ignored in
the academic literature.
On the surface, a strong case can be made for directorial liability
imposed through statutory enactment.47 At the core of this claim is
the notion that the board is the legal and functional command
centre of the corporation. Under most Canadian corporate
statutes, the board is vested with the responsibility of managing
(and, in some cases, supervising) the business and affairs of the
corporation.48 Although this legal requirement seems to imply
that directors must be actively involved in the day-to-day
management of the corporation, judicial interpretation has recog-
nized a much more circumscribed role.49 While directors are under
a duty to be informed about the activities of the corporation, they
are not bound to participate in or to approve every decision made
by the corporation. Rather, their role is one of general oversight,
direction and control.50
46 P. Halpern, M. Trebilcock and S. Turnball, "An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability
in Corporation Law" (1980),30 U.T.L.J. 117; F. Easterbrook and D. Fischel, "Limited
Liability and the Corporation" (1985), 52 U. Chi. L.Rev. 89; H. Hansmann and R
Kraakman, "Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts" (1991), 100
Yale L.J. 1878; J. Grundfest, "The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital
Markets Perspective" (1992), 102 Yale L.J. 387; and D. Leebron, "Limited Liability,
Tort Victims and Creditors" (1991),91 Col. L. Rev. 1565.
47 Trebilcock et al., supra; J. Groia and L. Abrams, "Searching for a Soul to Damn and a
Body to Kick: The Liability of Corporate Officers and Directors" in Meredith Memorial
Lectures 1990: Commercial Crime and Commercial Law (Y. Blais 1991), pp. 125-7.
48 Section 115(1) of Ontario Business Corporations Act, 1990, RS.O. 1990, c. B.16.
49 For an extreme and, no doubt, outdated articulation of this view, see: Brazilian Rubber
Plantations and Estates, Ltd. (Re), [1911]1 Ch. 425 (C.A.); and City Equitable Fire
Insurance Co. Ltd. (Re) , [1925]1 Ch. 407 (C.A.).
50 Generally, the board is required to set strategic objectives for the corporation and then to
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The central role of the board in the legal model is echoed by
various economic theories that purport to explain why economic
activity is organized in firms rather than by market contracts. 51
Some theorists place faith in firm hierarchy, namely the ability of
those at the apex of the corporation, presumably the board, to
direct firm resources by command rather than negotiation and
contract.52 Other theorists emphasize the complex monitoring and
control mechanisms that are supervised by the board. 53 Regardless
of the precise rationale, institutional oversight by the board is a
key functional feature that explains the survival ofthe firm.
In view of the central monitoring and control function that the
board performs in relation to its shareholder obligations, it is not
at all surprising that the state would view it as the natural (i.e.,
least cost) avoider of corporate social harm. The logic is seduc-
tively simple. To perform its monitoring function effectively on
behalf of shareholders, boards of directors rely on a number of
different organizational mechanisms, including channels of
communication that provide for the transmittal of real-time infor-
mation to the board; specialized institutions (i.e., specialized sub-
committees of the board) that provide expertise in the review and
analysis of collected information; and, finally, levers that enable
the board to shift corporate performance in response to the infor-
mation received. Thus, with these mechanisms for collecting,
analyzing and reacting to information already in place, the costs to
the board of attending to other explicit obligations in its decision-
making should be marginal, particularly in view of the tighter
boundaries on directorial discretion entailed by enumerated social
obligations.
Take, for example, the requirement that boards of directors be
explicitly responsible for the corporation's failure to meet sundry
review the corporation's performance regularly with a view to determining whether these
objectives are being realized; to ensure the corporation's compliance with its legal and
social responsibilities; to negotiate and then review the effectiveness of executive
compensation arrangements; to plan for executive succession; to vet conflict of interest
transactions to ensure fairness to the corporation; and, finally, to resolve crisis situations
(e.g., financial distress).
51 R. Coase, "The Nature ofthe Firm" (1937), 4 Economica 386, reproduced in G. Stigler
and K. Boulding, eds., Readings in Price Theory (Homewood, Ill., Richard D. Irwin,
1952), p. 331.
52 Coase, ibid.
53 Jensen and Meckling, supra, footnote 34; O. Williamson, "Corporate Governance"
(1984),93 Yale L.J.1197.
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environmental liabilities. Even in the absence of explicit directors'
liability, a well functioning board would already be monitoring the
various parts of the corporation's production process that entail
environmental risk. 54 In part, this monitoring may be undertaken
in response to explicit enterprise liabilities. In part, however, the
board may be monitoring these activities with a view to ensuring
low cost, efficient production. Once the board (or management on
the board's behalf) has established mechanisms for centralized
collection and transmission of general performance data, it can be
argued that the marginal costs of modifying these mechanisms so
as to include additional data and/or interpret these data against
different performance benchmarks will be low or trivial. In other
words, by imposing supplementary liability on directors, the state
is able to exploit intra-firm economies of scope.
It is important to note, however, that the case for supple-
mentary directors' liability need not turn exclusively on the claim
that the board, as among different corporate actors, is the least
cost avoider of proscribed conduct. Even if they are not, directors
may be the best group within the corporation to identify the true
least-cost avoiders and then, if permissible, to arrange for the
transfer of liability to them. Although the line separating control
and transfer of risks is murky, the idea is that through explicit
insurance and indemnification contracts, through the retention of
outside experts in monitoring and control, and through the
creation of explicit monitoring groups within the corporation and
the formal transfer of authority to them, boards are able to shift
the risks that are initially imposed on them and, therefore, the
responsibility for compliance with legal and social obligations. Of
course, the successful transfer of these risks depends on a number
of factors, the most important being the state's willingness to
legally recognize the legitimacy of these risk transfers.
The board's superior risk-shifting ability is a function of its
access to firm proprietary information and its low co-ordination
costs in negotiating transfers of risk. The board is typically
comprised of a relatively small group of individuals who share
similar values, views and goals. As well, the board enjoys an
established organizational structure with a high claim on
54 The role of the board in the context of environmental responsibilities is discussed by
Diane Saxe, Environmental Offences: Corporate Responsibility and Executive Liabilities
(Aurora, Canada Law Book Inc., 1990).
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corporate resources to fund its activities. For all of these reasons,
the board, particularly in comparison to far flung shareholders
who are more remote from internal corporation decision-making,
is best able to identify risk and then transfer it to other actors.
Indeed, if anything, the concern may be that the board, especially
in relation to risk transfers to employees, will be able to negotiate
terms that reflect disproportionate bargaining power and not
optimal allocations of risk.
The final argument buttressing the case for directors' liability
relates to the role of outside directors. Where the interests of
shareholders and managers converge in the direction of
proscribed conduct, the inclusion of outside directors on the board
of directors narrows the scope for wrongful conduct. In contrast to
inside managers, the economic stake (both financial and human
capital) that most outside directors have in firms upon whose
board they serve is quite limited. Most directors having outside
appointments on the boards of public companies are individuals
who do not depend for their livelihood on the income received for
board service.55 Most, in fact, are senior management personnel
from other companies.56
As a result of this limited economic stake, outside directors are
much less likely than management to be swayed by shareholder
desires for wrongful conduct in end-period situations. Quite the
opposite - outside directors will worry that conduct that debases
their reputational investment will induce spillover effects that will
reduce their effectiveness, thus the value of their economic
investment, in their primary activities. The CEO of another public
company sitting as an outside director is unlikely to relish the
thought of being implicated in conduct that contravenes explicit
legal obligations. The same would be true for professional advisers
55 Few outside directors hold large stock positions in the companies on whose boards they
sit. Moreover, the standard compensation arrangements for outside director service are
not keyed to corporate performance. Instead, directors are compensated on the basis of a
relatively low annual fee augmented by bonuses tied to attendance at board and sub-
committee meetings. Kom/Ferry Board of Directors, Fifth Annual Survey in Canada,
1991 (73% of surveyed companies compensate directors with a combination of an annual
retainer plus per meeting fees. In 1990, the average total combined fees paid to Canadian
directors (including committee service) equalled $17,160). See also: Canadian Direc-
torship Practices: Compensation of Boards of Directors, Report 72-91 (Ottawa,
Conference Board of Canada, 1991).
56 Indeed, according to the KornlFerry Survey, the preferred candidates (by 95% of
surveyed CEOS) for outside directors are "active CEOs and COOs", and the second most
desired category is "retired CEOS" (76%).
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who serve as outside directors, even when their firms have profes-
sional relationships with the company. Thus, as between the
interests of the corporation on whose board they serve and their
own interests in safeguarding the value of their investment in
reputational capital, outside directors will almost always favour
the latter, thereby increasing the efficacy of directors' liability.
2. Cracks in the Edifice: Limiting the Case for Directors'
Liability
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the case for supple-
mentary directors' liability would appear to be relatively
unassailable. Once the state determines that enterprise liability is
incapable of aligning societal and corporate (i.e., shareholder)
interests, the imposition of liability on directors naturally follows.
And while the formation of a supplementary liability regime
requires the state to define precisely the duties and penalties
imposed on directors, these issues are largely secondary design
issues that do not impact on the basic soundness of targeting
directors.
Yet, to this point, the discussion has assumed that directorial
oversight and control of the corporation's social responsibilities by
directors can be invoked at relatively low social cost. However,
careful examination of the case in favour of directors' liability
demonstrates reliance on several hidden assumptions that under-
state the true social costs accompanying directors' liability. As in
most other areas of public policy, the internalization of the costs of
corporate wrongdoing is not an absolute goal.57 If, when viewed
from a societal perspective, it can be shown that the costs (i.e., to
wealth creation) of directors' liability outweigh the benefits, then
legislative caution in involving directors in the pursuit of public
goals is merited. For instance, were directors to react to directors'
liability by recoiling from socially optimal levels of risk-taking,
then this behavioural response should be considered in the social
calculus governing the use of directors' liability.
In the following discussion, I identify and assess the importance
57 For instance, while some critics (extreme naturalists) have called for a societal prohi-
bition on all activities that entail any risk of harm to the environment, most commen-
tators, even those affiliated with the environmentalist movement, recognize that such
outcomes are neither feasible nor desirable. At some point, the spotted owl takes a back
seat to life-saving drug production.
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of qualifications on the use of directors' liability. Specifically, I
focus on the role of director risk aversion; limited availability of
risk-shifting strategies; managerial board domination; and sub-
goal pursuit. In conjunction, these factors imply a far more
qualified case for directors' liability than is traditionally acknowl-
edged by its enthusiasts. In no particular order, I discuss each
below.
(i) Director Risk Aversion
Outside directors are prized for the integrity, judgment and
experience they bring to the management of the corporation.
These attributes are undoubtedly a reflection of the considerable
success that directors are required to demonstrate before
becoming eligible for an appointment. And, as was mentioned
earlier, the value of these accomplishments constitutes a crucial
plank in the case for directorial liability. Essentially, the outside
director posts his or her reputational investment as bond that is
subject to forfeiture in the event that the corporation's perfor-
mance violates community norms of behaviour, and these viola-
tions are traced to some sort of failure by directors. In the simplest
case, forfeiture is triggered by legal sanction. But, as Charny has
argued, non-legal sanctions may also impose penalties on wrong-
doers that are no less stinging than legal ones. 58
For the outside director, posting this bond is not something that
is done lightly. Unlike other sorts of investments that are subject
to market diversification, the outside director's reputation is not.
H the board is seen to have contributed to the corporation's failure
to comply with certain explicit or implicit social obligations, all of
the directors' reputational capital will be debased. The public
criticism that outside directors have received following a host of
recent corporate failures is evidence of the intensity of this
sanction.59 The fear of sanction is undoubtedly magnified by virtue
of the nature of boardroom decision-making. Outside directors
58 D. Chamy, "Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relations" (1990), 104 Harv. L.Rev.
373.
59 A vivid illustration of this risk is provided by the recent shareholders meeting of Royal
Trustco Ltd., the ailing trust company in the HeeslEdper Group. During a 4-hour, 10-
minute special shareholders meeting called to approve the sale of substantially all of the
trust company assets to Royal Bank, the directors and management were excoriated by
irate shareholders. "Shareholders speak out: 'You have brought this company to its
knees' ", Globe and Mail, Saturday, June 19, p. Bt.
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may not have been mainly, or even marginally, responsible for
certain decisions, but unless the- board is subject to legal prose-
cution, there will be little opportunity for innocent directors to
exculpate themselves. Directors must expect the public to tar the
board of a misperforming company with a broad brush.
In this environment, a board that cannot effectively control OL
transfer risks of social liability is likely to become extremely risk
averse in its decision-making. Instead of evaluating and then
adopting projects under a positive net present value rule, directors
are more likely to consider extraneous factors that reflect extreme
sensitivity to the prospects of legal and social sanction. The
predictable consequence of directorial risk aversion will be to bias
project choice towards less risky projects, even though these
projects have lower positive (or in the extreme, negative) net
present values in relation to other available projects. In this
respect, directors' liability may seriously jeopardize allocative
efficiency goals.
(ii) Limited Availability of Risk-Shifting Strategies
Director risk aversion would not be so severe if effective risk-
shifting strategies were readily available to the board. The most
obvious way to protect oneself from the risk of director liability is
through insurance. Indeed, elected politicians have frequently
invoked the prospect of risk-shifting through insurance contracts
as a way of defusing business concern over the proliferation of
directors' liabilities. The belief is widespread that if only directors
were willing to pay the price, private insurance markets would be
able to provide directors with effective protection from non-trivial
financial losses related to corporate wrongdoing.60
Unfortunately, the gulf between perception and reality
respecting the availability of directors' insurance coverage is large.
In an analysis of the directors' and officers' (0&0) insurance
market in Canada, Daniels and Hutton find that, as a specialty or
fringe line of insurance, D&O coverage is subject to abrupt and
quite dramatic fluctuations in supply.61 These supply fluctuations
(j() In arguing for the adoption of revisions aimed at expanding the liability of directors
under the provincial Employment Standards Act, the Ontario NDP Government
frequently expressed the view that insurance would be available to protect directors. See
brief discussion in R. Nixon and L. Tennant, "Obligations of Officers and Directors
under the Ontario Employment Standards Act" (draft paper on file with author)_
61 Ronald J. Daniels and Susan M. Hutton, "The Capricious Cushion: The Implications of
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can be measured in a number of ways: pnce and deductible
increases, coverage exclusions and compression of coverage
periods.62 The most distressing problems are related to growth in
excluded categories of insurance and in coverage restrictions. The
use of these restrictions means that at some points in the
insurance-cycle coverage for certain D&O liability risks will not be
available at any price. For example, in 1987, the last year for which
data were available, 91% of the insurance policies written in
Canada excluded liability for pollution and environmental damage
and 17% of the policies contained exclusions for actions by various
regulatory agencies.63 Furthermore, most insurance policies were
written on a claims-made basis and allow for only relatively short
discovery periods after termination.
The net effect of these various restrictions is to make risk-
shifting via insurance an extremely speculative strategy for most
directors. Even if directors can secure appropriate levels of
insurance, the combined effect of the claims-made basis of
policies, relatively short insurance terms, and compressed
discovery periods still leaves directors vulnerable to civil actions
arising out of conduct undertaken during the term of the policy but
which were not commenced until after expiry of the policy.
If insurance offers directors only limited and capricious oppor-
tunities for risk-shifting, what other strategies exist? Under most,
though not all, statutory liability provisions, directors are able to
escape liability for corporate wrongdoing if they can satisfy a due
diligence defence. Under the due diligence test, courts will permit
directors to shift risks to officers, consultants, and other outside
experts so long as their reliance on these individuals is reasonable.
In this respect, retention of and reliance on specialized experts
offers the board some additional scope for risk-shifting.
the Directors' and Officers' Insurance Liability Crisis on Canadian Corporate Gover-
nance" (1993), 22 C.B.L.J. 182. Also see: D. Griffiths and L. Theall, "Indemnity &
Insurance: False Security?" (draft paper on file with author).
62 To account for the differential impact of these factors on insurance availability, the
Wyatt Company constructs a premium index that attempts to capture the combined
effect of these trends on total coverage. Taking 1974 as a base year of 100, the Wyatt
Premium Index stood at 71.2 in the United States and 58.6 in Canada in 1982. By 1984,
the index had fallen further to 54.3 in the U.S. and 52.4 in Canada. In 1987, however, the
U.S. index stood at 682.4 and the Candian index at 361.1. Essentially, during the three-
year period between 1984 and 1987, D&O insurance became 13 times more expensive for
American companies and 7 times more expensive for Canadian ones.
63 The Wyatt 1987 Directors' and Officers' and Fiduciary Liability Survey, Chicago, 1987
(the Wyatt 1987 Survey), p. 58.
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Nevertheless, risk-shifting to inside or outside experts pursuant
to a due diligence defence is subject to inherent limitations.
Before permitting directors to rely on delegations to experts
(either outside or inside the corporation), directors are still
required to show that they exercised due care and diligence in the
selection and monitoring of these individuals or firms. The
continuous monitoring obligation tends to subvert the capacity of
directors to effect crisp delegations of authority. Not only are
directors required to react to problems that arise under an internal
monitoring system, but, as well, they are also expected to conduct
periodic review to ensure that the system installed by experts is
working effectively and, if not, to take immediate and appropriate
action.64 Obviously, the spectre of ex post judicial review of
conduct taken after diligent delegation creates considerable
uncertainty for directors in knowing whether they have, in fact,
shifted liability risks.
No doubt, at least part of the difficulty for directors in imple-
menting effective risk-shifting strategies through delegation is
related to judicial concerns about opportunistic delegation. As
was mentioned earlier, directors might attempt to exploit their
command and control powers within the corporation by thrusting
their statutory obligations on lower level employees for
compliance with social responsibilities. While, in theory, it is
always open to employees to quit companies whose boards are
making unfair demands of them, non-diversifiable investments in
firm-specific assets may create undesirable lock-in effects, which
impair employee exit and, as a result, erode the strength of threat
strategies aimed at limiting the assumption of risks or at extracting
fair compensation for risks that are assumed.
However, judicial uncertainty may extend beyond these
concerns of board coercion and reflect a desire to effect social loss-
spreading. As Trebilcock and Priest have both argued in the tort
64 In the recent Bata case, for instance, the court considered the following factors in deter-
mining whether the directors of a company which had unlawfully discharged waste into
the environment were liable for the breach: (i) were the directors aware of industry
standards in controlling comparable environmental risks; (ii) did the directors establish a
pollution control system; (iii) did the directors monitor regularly management's
compliance with the system, and, in particular, did they ensure that they would be
informed by officers of any non-compliance in a timely manner; (iv) in the event that the
system failed, did the directors immediately and personally react? See R. v. Bata Indus-
tries Ltd. (1992),9 O.R. (3d) 329 at pp. 362-3, 70 C.C.C. (3d) 394, 7 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 245
(Prov. Div.).
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context, courts, while paying lip service to the spirit of traditional
doctrinal negligence standards, have in actuality interpreted these
standards in a way that permits them to distribute losses broadly
across society.65 In the case of directors' liability, courts may well
reason that by imposing losses directly on directors, loss-spreading
goals will be realized because of insurance coverage. Put simply,
statutory defences of reasonable care and diligence constitute only
a weak fetter on judicial social engineering. Indeed, cases
regarding directors' liabilities for the collection and remittance of
sundry governmental payments reveal in arresting terms the diffi-
culties that directors confront in identifying durable and effective
safe harbours.66 The difficulty, of course, is that without recourse
65 See, generally, G. Priest, "The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law" (1987),
96 Yale L.J. 1521; and M. Trebilcock, "The Social-Insurance Deterrence Dilemma of
Modern North American Tort Law: A Canadian Perspective on the Liability Insurance
Crisis" (1987),24 San Diego L. Rev. 929.
66 The notorious Fraser case is a telling example of these problems (Fraser (Trustee of) v.
M. N. R. (1987),87 D.T.C. 250, 64 C.B.R. (N.S.) 58 (T.C.C.». Fraser was one of three
directors on the board of a small company that failed to remit certain taxes owed to
Revenue Canada and which later became bankrupt. Fraser was a 15% shareholder ofthe
company and was responsible for manufacturing operations. There were two other
principals of the company who were also directors, managers and shareholders. These
individuals had control over all financial aspects of the company's activities. One of them
was trained as a chartered accountant. Although Fraser had signing authority with
respect to the company's bank account, he used it only once. In 1981, the company ran
into financial and tax remittance difficulties, which became apparent to Fraser in March,
1982. At that time and several months later, Fraser made inquiries of the other two
principals respecting the nature of these problems. He was assured that although there
were arrears with Revenue Canada, they would be covered by profits from contracts with
which Fraser was acquainted. Despite Fraser's inquiries of the other principals, the court
refused to allow him to escape personal liability for the tax shortfall through reliance on a
due diligence defence because he "did absolutely nothing to prevent the failure". The
court stated that:
Although (Fraser's) expertise lay in the field of manufacturing operations, I cannot
believe that he did not possess the skill and ability necessary to formulate policies
required to ensure that (the company) was at least discharging its obligations under
(the Act). This is not a case in which a director is forced to rely on other directors or
officers or subordinate employees because those others possess skills which he does
not. Mr. Fraser did not make an unsuccessful attempt to prevent default. He simply
did not try.
At least one commentator has argued that Fraser could have prevented the corpora-
tion's failure to remit taxes by requesting an immediate board meeting, examining
financial information with respect to source deduction, establishing a corporate policy
and procedure that would ensure compliance with the Act, obtaining an undertaking
from the treasurer that such policies and procedures would be complied with in the
future, and, finally, undertaking review himself of the corporation's financial infor-
mation to ensure that the treasurer was complying with established policies and proce-
dures. However, it is clear that such a course of action sterilizes any significant delegation
of authority to inside or outside specialists, thereby complicating the search for an
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to effective insurance policies, judicially imposed liability on
directors does not end up being spread across society, but falls
squarely on the shoulders of directors. Faced with limited risk-
shifting opportunities, the board will rationally constrain socially
desirable risk-taking in an effort to limit directors' liability. Alter-
natively, as in the cases surveyed at the outset of this article,
directors will resign from boards at the first sign of crisis.
(iii) Managerial Domination of the Board
Compounding the difficulties that risk-averse directors face in
shifting liability risks are the traditional problems relating to inside
domination of corporate boards. As numerous commentators
have pointed out, corporate boards are dominated by inside
management in the case of widely held companies or, in the case of
closely held companies, by controlling shareholders. 67 This
domination derives from the tight control wielded by insiders over
the nature and quality of information that reaches the board and
over the opportunities for boards to discuss the implications of this
information for corporate performance. This control does not
reflect improper motives on the part of insiders. Rather, it is a
natural outgrowth of the time constraints that limit outside
directors' involvement in board activities and, more importantly,
of the appropriate deference that outsiders should show to insiders
who are peforming their duties responsibly and effectively. Given
this control, outside directors will face daunting obstacles in
challenging management's handling of the corporation's social
obligations.
However, this problem of deferential directors is usually atten-
uated in companies that are suffering crises relating to lacklustre
economic performance, conflict or fraud. Empirical studies of the
board of directors show that the more severe the crisis confronting
the company, the more likely it is that insiders will lose their stran-
glehold over the board.68 Irrespective of the strength of the
relationship that outside directors have to the company, most
effective safe harbour. (R. Lynn Campbell, "The Fiduciary Duties of Corporate
Directors: Exploring New Avenues" (1988),36 Canadian Tax J. 918).
67 See, generally, Brudney, supra, footnote 35.
68 The seminal study is by Myles Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality (Boston, Harvard U.
Press, 1971). For a more recent study confirming the same results, see: J. Lorsch with E.
MacIver, Pawns or Potentates: The Reality of America's Corporate Boards (Cambridge,
Harv. Business School, 1989).
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outside directors will be sufficiently attentive to their shareholder
and societal obligations in distress situations that they will resist
inside domination . Yet, given the deferential stance usually
adopted by outside directors, delays will inevitably plague outside
directors in asserting effective control over the corporation.69
Possibly, these problems can be ameliorated by institutional
investors placing early pressure on the board in distressed
companies. 7o
(iv) Sub-goal Pursuit
The final problem confronting both inside and outside directors
in meeting social obligations is sub-goal pursuit, namely the
prospect that lower level employees whose co-operation is
essential for the implementation of an effective corporate
compliance regime will fail to take proper care in performing
activities that entail risks of directors' liability. 71 In essence, sub-
goal pursuit is just another species of agency problem. The fact
that employee goals and interests are not convergent with the
board's means that employees will systematically deviate from the
instructions given by management and the board. Lower level
employees may be less risk-averse than the board or management
because they may feel confident that murky internal lines of
accountability will insulate them from responsibility for corporate
wrongdoing. 72 The problems created by sub-goal pursuit are
exacerbated when the board is dependent upon lower level
employees for the collection, analysis and dissemination of crucial
performance information. By withholding or, even more aggres-
sively, distorting front-line information, employees may be able to
bias board decision-making in directions that would be deemed
perverse were accurate information available,73 Thus, the
69 In rapidly deteriorating situations, these lags may mean that outside directors never have
the chance to exert meaningful scrutiny and control. Essentially, the company goes
bankrupt before the directors muster the wherewithal to act.
70 Essentially, institutional pressure, providing it is brought early enough, gives outside
directors the leverage to alter the traditional boardroom dynamic of deference.
71 See C. Argyris, Integrating the Individual and the Organization (1964); R. Likert, The
Human Organization (1967).
72 See discussion of these points in the context of corporate crime: J. Coffee, "Beyond the
Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an
Effective Legal Response" (1977),63 Va. L.Rev. 1099; and" 'No Soul to Damn: No
Body to Kick': An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment"
(1981),79 Mich. L.Rev. 386.
73 However, recent improvements in information collection and retrieval, as well as
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inclusion of sub-goal pursuit into the analysis of supplementary
liability raises legitimate concern over whether a board, even one
that is committed to full realization of the corporation's legal and
social obligations, will be able to ensure responsible corporate
conduct. Obviously, the severity of these problems is greatest in
those companies with complex and multi-tiered internal organiza-
tional structures.
3. Assessment of the Case for Supplementary Directors'
Liability
The case for supplementing enterprise liability with specific
directors' liability is more complex than hitherto has been
acknowledged. While considerations of the board's access to
information and its control over the corporate machinery push in
the direction of liability, consideration of director risk aversion,
limited insurance availability, sanction indeterminacy emanating
from judicial loss-spreading, inside domination and sub-goal
pursuit push in the opposite direction. In the end, the imposition
of explicit liability on the board may create more social costs than
benefits. In some cases, liability chill will deter talented
individuals from accepting a nomination for board service. Alter-
natively, individuals may agree to serve on boards, but then insist
as a precondition ofservice that management sedulously avoid any
activities entailing the prospect, however remote, of directors'
liability. In either case, the costs, to the corporation and to
society, of foregone wealth production are clear and unequivocal.
IV. Conclusion
The previous discussion underscores the daunting complexities .
for policy-makers in determining, first, when enterprise liability
should be deviated from and then who, as among the share-
holders, creditors, directors, managers and employees, should be
the target of this liability. In this article, I have simply focused on
the board of directors - a group which, in Canada at least, is
being increasingly fingered for liability by legislatures. While it is
compression of corporate hierarchies through paring of middle-management positions,
may partially counter these problems. See discussion in P. Drucker; Post-Capitalist
Society (Butterworth-Heinemann, 1993).
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tempting to conclude that the analysis required to justify the
imposition or removal of directors' liability is so complex and fact
specific that forming general observations is parlous, it seems that
there are at least a few general guidelines that follow from this
ana.lysis, and which assist in devising optimal corporate liability
regImes.
The first and most obvious conclusion is that policy-makers
must proceed cautiously before deviating from enterprise liability
as the primary, if not exclusive, mechanism for aligning social and
corporate interests. As the earlier discussion suggests, even in the
face of endemic societal limitations on the imposition of optimal
fines, there are clear grounds for assuming that enterprise liability
is an effective control regime. There will, of course, be situations
in which enterprise liability is likely to fail, but the crucial question
is whether the social costs of these failures are so severe that
abandonment of the flexibility inherent in the enterprise liability
regime is merited. Unlike the blunt instrument of ex post fines
against specific corporate actors which is available to the state, a
wide array of internal sanctions and rewards can be used by corpo-
rations to ensure socially responsible corporate behaviour,
including promotion, compensation, criticism, and dismissal.
Policy-makers ought to be attentive to the likelihood that creation
of supplementary legal liability regimes may diminish the attrac-
tiveness to shareholders of establishing and operating better
calibrated and nuanced systems on their own.
However, once policy-makers have decided to opt for directors'
liability, they should be careful to ensure the availability of clear,
crystallized safe harbours for diligent directors. While explicit
standards will undoubtedly retard investment by directors in
innovative risk control strategies, director risk aversion combined
with infirmities in the D&O insurance market make crystallized,
rather than fuzzy, standards desirable. Crystallized standards limit
the ability of courts to pervert statutory standards in an effort to
achieve loss-spreading objectives. Clear standards will also enable
directors, even in the context of inside dominated boards, to make
discrete, limited inquiries of management that are aimed at
ensuring fidelity to social and legal obligations, but without
impairing the overall dynamic of the board in the well-performing
company. In this respect, the few statutes that impose absolute
liability on directors (e.g., responsibility for employee wages and
benefits) should be an early target for legislative revocation.
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Another point relates to the inherent limits in any corporate
liability regime, however constructed, on its capacity to vindicate
simultaneously all of society's objectives,?4 Generally, corporate
liability should be viewed as a deterrence mechanism: by internal-
izing all of the costs of wrongful conduct within the corporation,
corporations will be encouraged to engage in socially responsible
levels of activity. However, the reliance on absolute directors'
liability provisions in some contexts suggests that other goals
(most likely compensation-related) are implicated. If compen-
sation for certain groups, e.g. workers displaced by structural
change, is a valuable objective, schemes which more efficiently
realize this objective should be devised.75 One is particularly
struck by the paralyzing terms of the debate which has surrounded
the issue of whether directors or creditors are the most appro-
priate risk-bearers for back-wages and other benefits owed to
employees in bankruptcy. 76 In focusing on the narrow issue of how
best to meet these claims, policy-makers have largely ignored the
disconcerting reality that even if a claim for back-wages and
benefits were fully met, many employees would still be left to bear
considerable non-diversifiable losses from foregone future
earnings,?7 From a societal standpoint, these very concentrated
losses are deserving of much greater policy attention than the
relatively trivial losses involved in unpaid back-wages.
A final point relates to the rather simplistic and cynical
perspective that some public officials have brought to the enter-
prise of constructing and implementing optimal corporate liability
regimes. Implicit in the way in which directors' liability statutes
74 Trebilcock, Hartle, Dewees and Prichard, The Choice ofGoverning Instrument (Ottawa,
Economic Council of Canada, 1982).
75 See discussion in Daniels, supra, footnote 26, and in M. Trebilcock, M. Chandler, and R.
Howse, Trade and Transitions (London, Routledge, 1990).
76 The issue of unpaid employee wages has loomed large in the process of revising Canada's
bankruptcy legislation. Numerous drafts of proposed legislation were defeated on the
employee wage issue, specifically whether employees should receive a super-priority
over secured claimants of the firm (and to what extent) or whether employee claims
should be dealt with via a state-administered unpaid wages fund furnished by a payroll
tax. For a review ofthis debate, see: D.B. Gleig, "Unpaid Wages in Bankruptcy" (1987),
21 U.B.C.L.Rev. 61.
n The average loss to employees whose companies entered bankruptcy was found to be
$900 in 1980 (Canada, Report of the Committee on Wage Protection in Matters of
Bankruptcy and Insolvency to the Minister ofConsumer and Corporate Affairs (October
1981), p. 30). This number pales in comparison to the considerable welfare losses that
employees can suffer from premature termination. See discussion and data in Daniels,
supra, footnote 26.
9-24 C.B.L.J.
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are promulgated and enforced is the assumption that dire~ors and
other corporate insiders are cavalier about corporate failure.
After all, the vast preponderance of modern directors' liability
sanctions are triggered only when the company is bankrupt and
the corporate estate is insufficient to cover all of the explicit social
obligations. Yet, it is important to recognize the extremely
powerful incentives that virtually all corporate actors have to
avoid failure. For shareholders, creditors, managers and
employees, corporate failure is an outcome which entails devas-
tating financial hardship and, in the case of directors, profound
personal embarrassment. The cases where a corporation deliber-
ately opts for failure in order to avoid explicit or implicit obliga-
tions are few and far between, and policy-makers should avoid
viewing these pathological cases as a paradigm for regulation.
Moreover, policy-makers should bear in mind that failure is both
an inevitable and desirable product of risk-taking in particular,
and capitalism in general- recall Schumpeter's apt description of
capitalism as a process of creative destruction.78 In this vein,
rather than holding those individuals associated with failure up to
societal condemnation, a more restrained, sympathetic stance is in
order. Rolling back the unbridled expansion of statutory
directors' liability provisions would constitute a first important
step in this direction.
I should emphasize that this claim is not borne out of any innate
antipathy to the role of the modern welfare state - just the
opposite. My concern is that if left unchecked, burgeoning depen-
dence on directors' liability will undermine the capacity of the
public corporation to generate the wealth surplus necessary to
fund the most cherished goals of the welfare state. To accom-
modate itself to the globalization of the modern economy,
Canadian industry has experienced one of the most profound and
wrenching periods of structural adjustment ever. The escalating
pace of layoffs and plant closures powerfully illustrates the
magnitude of this transition. If, upon close inspection, there is
evidence that directors' liability provisions are hobbling either the
daring or the creativity of the traditional corporate governance
apparatus in responding to globalization pressures, then this is an
issue which commands careful and immediate legislative
attention.
78 J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York, Harper and Brothers,
1942).
